I am excited to congratulate my fellow partner Bonnie Neuman on her expanded role as the new head of our market-leading real estate finance practice.
In a recent concurring opinion, Judge Rowan D. Wilson sifts through and attempts to clear up some confusion in New York case law surrounding the doctrine of standing in foreclosure actions. The question at issue involves the difference between the doctrine of standing, on the one hand, and whether a plaintiff is a party to contract – an essential element of a foreclosure action – on the other.
In December 2020, as part of the larger National Defense Authorization Act, the Corporate Transparency Act was enacted. The Act requires that anonymous shell companies, most notably limited liability companies and partnerships, disclose their ultimate beneficial ownership and control in an effort to combat corruption, money laundering and financing of terrorism, among other things, in the United States.
Since declaring a State of Emergency on March 7, 2020 in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, New York Governor Andrew Cuomo has issued a number of Executive Orders providing protections for both commercial and residential tenants and mortgagors. On March 20, 2020, Governor Cuomo issued Executive Order 202.8 prohibiting the enforcement of an eviction of any residential or commercial tenant or a foreclosure of any residential or commercial property for a period of ninety days. Most recently, Executive Order 202.66 extended the residential moratorium through January 1, 2021, and Executive Order 202.81 extended the commercial moratorium through January 31, 2021.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, New York State courts have granted a number of preliminary injunctions enjoining UCC foreclosures for a period of time. For example, in D2 Mark LLC vs. Orei VI Investments LLC and Shelbourne BRF LLC, Shelbourne 677 LLC v. SR 677 BWAY LLC, the courts found that elements of the UCC foreclosures were not commercially reasonable as a result of the pandemic and temporarily prevented the UCC foreclosures. However, not all borrowers have had the same success with preliminary injunctions.
In the recent case of Travelport Ltd v Wex Inc [2020] EWHC 2670 (Comm), the High Courts of England considered the construction of a material adverse effect clause in which a party sought to invoke the provision as a result of the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. Given the prevalence and importance of MAE Clauses in many commercial contracts such as facility agreements and acquisition agreements, we explore in this article the issues that the UK Courts considered when determining the construction of this MAE Clause in the context of a global pandemic.
Here is a rundown of some of Cadwalader's recent work on behalf of our clients.